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FORSAKING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS A MEANS TO 
PROSECUTE BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the early settlement of the Dakota Territory and other parts of 
the western United States, groups of settlers joined together to form wagon 
trains to provide for mutual defense and navigation.1  When attacked along 
the trail, a common defense strategy was to “circle up the wagons” to create 
a protective perimeter to shield the travelers and defend the attack.2  Since 
the first confrontations between prosecutors and alleged criminal organiza-
tions, lawyers and their corporate clients have employed a similar strategy 
to establish defensive perimeters.3  In the wake of Enron and other well-
publicized corporate corruption scandals, federal prosecutors have been 
empowered by new anti-corruption legislation and public outcry to develop 
strategies to counter wagon-circling tactics in corporate boardrooms.4  
Today, one of the most effective weapons for federal prosecutors in com-
bating corporate corruption is the corporate charging guidelines issued by 
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).5  This note examines the 
effects of this prosecutorial zeal on fundamental constitutional rights of em-
ployees of target corporations. 
United States Attorney James B. Comey diplomatically commented 
that the Thompson Memorandum (Thompson Memo) has “[p]rovided a 
balanced framework for DOJ attorneys to make difficult decisions.”6  
 
1. SARA E. QUAY, WESTERN EXPANSION 216 (Ray B. Brown ed., Greenwood Press 2002). 
2. Id. 
3. See generally William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in 
the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 637 (2006) (explaining that joint 
defense agreements permitted corporations and employees to participate in internal investigations 
without the risk of disclosure by the other party). 
4. See Andrew J. Ceresney et al., The Attorney-Client Privilege and Internal Investigations: 
Privilege Issues in Structuring an Investigation and Interviewing Witnesses, 163 PLI/N.Y. 207, 
219 (Dec. 2006) (noting that joint defense agreements between corporations and employees are 
disfavored under the DOJ’s corporate charging guidelines). 
5. See generally Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or 
Just a Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 415-21 (2005) (describing the DOJ’s various corporate 
charging guidelines). 
6. Interview by U.S. Attorney’s Office with United States Attorney James B. Comey 
Regarding DOJ’s Policy on Requesting Companies under Criminal Investigation to Waive the 
Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, 51 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 1, 5 (Nov. 2003), 
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However, few other legal commentators and practitioners share the same 
perspective.7  Most practitioners question Comey’s view of a balanced 
framework in this new environment, which induces companies to turn 
against their own employees in order to earn cooperation credits from the 
government and avoid wider criminal indictments.8  Many practitioners also 
wonder about the broader effects of the federal prosecutorial guidelines 
framework, which in practice advocate weakening basic constitutional 
safeguards that have been entrenched in our criminal system since its 
origin.9  The defense bar and other commentators have offered vigorous 
critical response to the government’s framework of prosecutorial methods.10  
They argue that the DOJ’s instructions to the federal prosecutors often lead 
to overzealous practice in combating corporate misconduct.11  Although the 
DOJ has recently responded to the myriad of criticism against its principles 
of federal prosecution of business organizations,12 ambiguities and concerns 
still remain.13 
This note intends to provide insight to the federal prosecutorial prac-
tices in the context of corporate investigations and the constitutional impli-
cations they carry for officers and employees of target entities.  It is not a 
comprehensive analysis of the new guidelines; rather, the note focuses on 
the provisions that guide prosecutors in decisions about whether to indict a 
company.  Part II of this note traces the origin of the current prosecutorial 
principles and guidelines, and provides the general basis for the myriad 
criticisms.  Part III provides a catalogue of the constitutional safeguards, 
which may be affected by these prosecutorial principles.  Additionally, this 
 
available at http://usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab.5106.pdf [hereinafter Comey 
Interview]. 
7. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO ABA HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES ON EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 3 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
attorneyclient/materials/hod/emprights_report_adopted.pdf (opposing the government’s policies 
and practices under the Thompson Memo) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See Adam Weiskittel & Brian Collins, Corporate Fraud, 69 TEX. B.J. 26, 26 (2006) 
(noting the increased concerns among the defense bar and commentators regarding the erosion of 
the attorney-client privilege in internal investigations); see also John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming 
Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 351 (2004) 
(arguing that prosecutors often proceed in their charging decisions without significant public 
scrutiny of the charges). 
11. Weiskittel & Collins, supra note 10, at 26.  
12. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads 
of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf 
[hereinafter McNulty Memo]. 
13. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the potential consequences of the new federal 
prosecutorial guidelines). 
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part describes the first court decision declaring certain components of these 
principles unconstitutional.  Part IV considers the public policy concerns 
connected with this set of prosecutorial principles.  In conclusion, part V 
offers a solution to these concerns. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 
As early as 1909, the United States Supreme Court in New York 
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,14 developed the 
legal theory that a business entity could be held accountable for the actions 
of agents and/or employees.15  The United States Supreme Court held that 
companies could be found criminally liable for any act committed by an 
employee in the course of such person’s employment if the act was 
intended to benefit the company.16  More than eighty years later, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the principle that a company may be 
“criminally liable for the unlawful acts of its agents, provided that the 
conduct is within the scope of the agent’s authority, whether actual or 
apparent.”17  Despite these early cases and statutes,18 it was a novel devel-
opment in June 1999 when the DOJ adopted a consistent approach to 
corporate prosecution.19  Since then, the DOJ has continuously refined its 
approach.20  To better understand the current criticisms of the DOJ’s prac-
tices in corporate investigations, it is useful to examine the original 
administrative policy, which began with the Holder Memo in 1999, and 
follow the revisions leading to the current formula.21 
 
14. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
15. New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 481. 
16. Id. at 495. 
17. United States v. Inv. Enter., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993). 
18. See Mark Robeck et al., Corporate Cooperation in the Face of Government 
Investigations, 17 HEALTH LAW. 20, 21-22 (2005) (citing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003) (RICO), Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd, 78ff(c) (1977) (FCPA) and Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 56 
Fed. Reg. 22762-01 (1991) (SGOs)). 
19. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron 
World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2006). 
20. Id. at 1100. 
21. See generally Baker, supra note 10, at 326-36 (addressing the criticism of the DOJ’s 
corporate charging guidelines and tracing the guidelines’ development throughout the years). 
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A. THE HOLDER MEMO 
In 1999, federal prosecutors were confronted with a rising tide of 
corporate criminal misconduct committed either by companies or on behalf 
of companies.22  To address this emerging concern, former Deputy Attorney 
General Eric H. Holder issued what has come to be known as the “Holder 
Memo.”23  This internal policy memorandum, officially entitled “Federal 
Prosecution of Companies,” contained prosecutorial guidelines to determine 
whether a corporate organization should be criminally charged, instead of, 
or in addition to, suspected culpable employees.24  It listed several factors 
for federal prosecutors to consider when deciding “whether to charge a 
corporation in a particular case.”25  To determine whether a corporate crimi-
nal action should be taken, federal prosecutors were instructed to consider 
eight specific factors in addition to the factors considered in an individual 
criminal charge.26  The new corporate factors were: 
(1) The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of 
harm to the public . . . 
(2) The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, 
including the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by 
corporate management . . . 
(3) The corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior 
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it . . . 
(4) The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of 
its agents including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate 
attorney-client and work product privileges . . .  
(5) The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance 
program . . .  
(6) The corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to 
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to 
improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to 
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to 
cooperate with the relevant government agencies . . .  
 
22. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Component Heads & U.S. Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations, preface 
(June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/append/ix/appendixk.pdf 
[hereinafter Holder Memo]. 
23. Id.; Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1099. 
24. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at preface. 
25. Id. 
26. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 22. 
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(7) Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to 
shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable . . . 
and 
(8) The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or 
regulatory enforcement actions . . . .27 
These factors constituted the DOJ’s first attempt to create a uniform 
approach in corporate investigations.28  The Holder Memo’s overall pur-
pose was to provide guidance only to federal prosecutors in an emerging 
environment of corporate corruption.29  The Holder Memo was also 
symbolic of the DOJ’s firming commitment to prosecute business organiza-
tions, calling for a vigorous enforcement of criminal laws against wrong-
doers.30  Accordingly, the Holder Memo marked a critical shift in the 
government’s attitude toward corporate investigations.31  Despite these 
intentions, the record does not indicate a rise in the number of prosecutions 
of business organizations after the Holder Memo was issued.32  However, 
four years after the Holder Memo was first issued, a new set of guidelines 
contained in the Thompson Memo affirmed and sharpened the DOJ’s 
commitment.33 
B. THE THOMPSON MEMO 
If the Holder Memo marked the beginning of a new era with respect to 
corporate prosecutions, the 2003 DOJ’s “Principles of Federal Prosecution 
of Business Organizations,” confirmed the direction.34  The Thompson 
Memo reiterated the DOJ’s firm commitment to combat corporate fraud 
through the prosecution of individuals for corporate malfeasance and/or the 
 
27. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at Part II.A. 
28. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1109. 
29. Id.  The eight enumerated factors were not meant to be outcome-determinative.  Id.  
Instead, under the Holder Memo, they were intended as an analysis framework for prosecutors, 
and prosecutors were given great latitude in their consideration of these factors.  Id. 
30. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at Part I.A. 
31. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 23. 
32. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1188 n.19 (reporting a decrease in criminal 
prosecutions of business organizations from 255 in fiscal year 1999, to 238 in fiscal year 2001). 
33. Id. at 1101. 
34. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations, preface (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_ 
guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo] (“The main focus of the revisions is increased 
emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”); see also Wray & 
Hur, supra note 19, at 1100-01 (noticing the introduction of several major revisions, particularly 
the emphasis on authentic corporate cooperation with government investigations). 
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company itself.35  Moreover, the Thompson Memo not only restated the 
Holder Memo’s prosecutorial principles, but changed them from 
discretionary to mandatory.36 
The Thompson Memo stated that its adoption was the result of a review 
of the utility of the Holder Memo prompted by several matters related to 
corporate misconduct, including those confronted by the President’s 
Corporate Fraud Task Force.37  It reinforced the DOJ’s ultimate goal of 
“[r]ooting out criminal corporate conduct” and did so partly by offering 
incentives for companies to report criminal conduct voluntarily.38 
In addition to the eight factors enumerated in the Holder Memo, the 
Thompson Memo introduced one new factor and amended the seventh 
factor.39  Under the amended seventh factor, a prosecutor must now weigh 
any disproportionate harm to innocent third parties and the public resulting 
from criminal charges against a company.40  In Part II.A(8), the Memo 
included a new factor, which took into account “the adequacy of the 
prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance.”41 
The new factors evinced a shift in the policies set forth in the Holder 
Memo.42  The Thompson Memo stated that the “imposition of individual 
criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future 
corporate wrongdoing [and] [o]nly rarely should provable individual 
culpability not be pursued.”43  This reasoning reversed the historical 
 
35. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1106-07 (noting that the Thompson Memo’s emphasis on 
prosecuting individuals for corporate misconduct and, where necessary, the company itself 
regardless of the extent of its cooperation with government investigations, was egregious). 
36. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Thompson Memo, 
supra note 34, at Part III.A; see also Couden, supra note 5, at 415 (considering the DOJ’s mixed 
messages to companies as to whether the provisions set forth in the Thompson Memo should in 
reality be considered as rules rather than discretionary guidelines, and opting for the former). 
37. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at preface.  The President’s Corporate Fraud Task 
Force was created by President George W. Bush in 2002 after several high-profile corporate 
scandals, such as Adelphia Communications, WorldCom, and HealthSouth companies.  Wray & 
Hur, supra note 19, at 1101.  Between March and June of 2002, WorldCom and Adelphia 
Communications disclosed severe corporate fraud incidents, and in March of 2003, HealthSouth, a 
large operator of rehabilitation hospitals and surgery centers disclosed a massive accounting fraud.  
Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 225-28 (2004). 
38. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1098. 
39. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part II.A.(7)-(8). 
40. Id. at Part II.A.(7).  
41. Id. at Part II.A.(8). 
42. Theodore V. Wells, Jr. et al., Current Developments in the Government’s Corporate 
Prosecution Policy, 1517 PLI/Corp 829, 833 (Nov. 2005); see also Couden, supra note 5, at 414 
(suggesting that charging culpable individuals rather than the company might prove more 
effective). 
43. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part I.B. 
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practice in prosecuting corporate crime from initially targeting the company 
to initially targeting individuals.44 
More significantly, the Thompson Memo, unlike its predecessor, 
placed the focus of the prosecutors’ charging decision on the effectiveness 
and authenticity of the company’s cooperation with the federal prose-
cutors.45  This was directly indicated in the commentary to the section 
“Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure.”46  Specifically, the Thompson 
Memo instructed the DOJ to closely scrutinize the degree of cooperation by 
the company to ensure that the company indeed does all it can to provide 
the prosecutors with necessary information, and does not “[m]erely pay[] 
lip service to cooperation.”47 
Like the Holder Memo, in theory, no factor was intended to be given a 
greater weight than the others.48  Rather, prosecutors were required to 
consider all nine factors contemporaneously.49  However, in practice, the 
degree of cooperation may have been assigned a heavier weight than other 
factors given the Thompson Memo’s emphasis on cooperation.50  Never-
theless, if the other factors outweighed the cooperation, prosecution of the 
business entity may have been warranted.51 
In practice, the Thompson Memo has received mixed reviews.52  An 
evaluation of the general impact of the Thompson Memo is necessary to 
weigh its utility, including the most important criticisms.  Much of this 
criticism is directed at specific provisions of the Thompson Memo, most 
notably the expectation of corporations’ waiver of attorney-client and work 
product privilege, and denial of advancement of legal fees and expenses to 
 
44. McLucas et al., supra note 3, at 633. 
45. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at preface (stressing “increased emphasis on and 
scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation”). 
46. Id. at Part VI.B.  The Memo provides: 
Another factor to be weighed . . . is whether the corporation, while purporting to 
cooperate, has engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation (whether or not 
rising to the level of criminal obstruction). Examples of such conduct include: overly 
broad assertions of corporate representation of employees or former employees; inap-
propriate directions to employees or their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate 
openly and fully with the investigation including, for example, the direction to decline 
to be interviewed; making presentations or submissions that contain misleading 
assertions or omissions; incomplete or delayed production of records; and failure to 
promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation. 
Id. 
47. Wells et al., supra note 42, at 833. 
48. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1136. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1145-46. 
51. Id. 
52. See generally id., at 1170-85 (defending the Thompson Memo and presenting the main 
criticism to it). 
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corporate officers and employees under investigation for corporate 
misconduct.53 
1. General Impact of the Thompson Memo 
The amendments and additions to the Thompson Memo have certainly 
strengthened the prosecutor’s hand, but not without questionable conse-
quences.54  On one hand, the companies’ waivers of their attorney-client 
privilege and/or work product protection count among the most contro-
versial effects because such waivers deprive companies of confidential 
communications.55  On the other hand, the Thompson Memo itself explains 
the benefits of indicting companies for malfeasance, including “enabl[ing] 
the government to address and be a force for positive change of corporate 
culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and punish white 
collar crime.”56  The most notable positive effects of the Thompson Memo 
include: companies are more sensitive to their responsibilities towards 
shareholders; more effective corporate compliance programs; less time is 
invested in criminal investigations, which permits companies to quickly re-
focus on their primary business activities; increased public confidence in 
corporate governance; and greater stability in the stock market.57 
Several corporate cooperation examples have confirmed that com-
panies have received the message of “cooperate and we will not indict you,” 
as seen in the Royal Dutch Shell and the Homestore, Inc. investigations—
Homestore, Inc. was under investigation for accounting fraud, but the pros-
ecutors were very impressed with the level of cooperation by the new man-
agement so they declined to charge the company.58  According to former 
Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Criminal Division, Christopher A. 
Wray, “in most cases, cooperation is an extremely important factor, and 
 
53. Id. at 1172, 1181-82. 
54. Id. at 1098. 
55. See Couden, supra note 5, at 418-20 (pointing out that disclosure under the Thompson 
Memo also exposes companies to a “host of liability concerns”). 
56. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part I.A. 
57. McLucas, et al., supra note 3, at 622; Kenneth M. Breen et al., The Future of Corporate 
“Cooperation” Under the Thompson Memorandum – Will There be a Shift Toward Greater 
Predictability? (Oct. 2005), http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail 
&pub_id=2-2026&site_id=494&detail=yes (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
58. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1135-36 (noting that extensive cooperation may result 
in a decline of charges and penalties); see also Andrew J. Levander, Recent Development in 
Securities Cases and Investigations, 1505 PLI/Corp 969, 983-85 (Sept. 2005) (discussing the 
Homestore, Inc. and Royal Dutch Shell investigations).  Royal Dutch Shell was under investiga-
tion for overstating its oil and gas reserves for 2002 and prior years, but was spared indictment 
given the extent of its cooperation.  Id. 
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getting credit for that cooperation can make a huge difference in our 
[federal prosecutors’] charging decision.”59 
However, the emphasis on corporate cooperation in federal criminal 
investigations has drawn significant criticism of the wider prosecutorial 
discretion created by the Thompson Memo.60  One subtle outcome has been 
that federal prosecutors across the country have interpreted the guidelines to 
the effect that they apply differently depending on the business sector being 
targeted.61  Other criticisms have more ominous implications, such as the 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection, and the 
detrimental effect of the prosecutorial practices on the companies’ 
relationships with their employees.62 
2. Criticism of the Thompson Memo Focusing on the Company-
Employee Relationship 
The Thompson Memo has been the subject of a great deal of criticism 
from the white-collar criminal defense bar.63  In particular, the defense bar 
has alleged that the change in prosecutorial attitude under this Memo has 
effectively eroded the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doc-
trine defenses.64  Recent criticisms also focused on the downstream effect 
of the pressure exercised by prosecutors on companies under investigation 
and the resulting myriad of implications for individual employees.65  
According to the guidelines laid out in the Thompson Memo, 
[a]nother factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the 
corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and 
agents. . . .  [A] corporation’s promise of support to culpable 
 
59. Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 22nd Annual Corporate 
Counsel Institute 5 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press_room/ 
speeches/2003_2986_rmrk121203Corprtconslinst.pdf. 
60. See Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 24 (noting the criticism regarding the DOJ’s policies’ 
effect on the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege routinely demanding waivers). 
61. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1102, 1153-63 (noting additional trends in the 
enforcement of the Thompson Memorandum principles in the areas of antitrust crimes, 
environmental crimes, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
62. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 20. 
63. Id. at 24. 
64. See Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War Over the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege on the Business of American Health Care, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301, 
317-18 (2006) (pointing out common concerns among members of the defense bar). 
65. See, e.g., Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the 
Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1225, 1232-33 (2006) (explaining that companies in their quest for cooperation credit with 
the government may use threats of termination or decline to provide counsel to employees, and/or 
fail to advise employees that the content of their interviews in internal investigations will be 
disclosed to the government). 
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employees and agents, either through the advancing of attorneys 
fees, through retaining the employees without sanction for their 
misconduct, or through providing information to the employees 
about the government’s investigation . . . may be considered by the 
prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation’s 
cooperation.66 
As this passage illustrates, the Thompson Memo paid small regard to 
loyalty between employer and employee, regardless of expectations of legal 
defense support. 
It has been argued that the government’s requirement that cooperation 
be “authentic,” in effect forced companies to place employees in a situation 
where their constitutional rights are endangered, or worse, violated without 
recourse.67  Within this context, the prosecutorial discretion may seem to be 
“an abuse of the charging power.”68  However, some commentators have 
argued that government-created incentives for corporate cooperation with 
federal investigators facilitate and accelerate the investigations.69  Further, 
in a hearing before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, a 
United States Attorney testified that it is “good practice” to ask a company 
to cooperate with and assist the federal prosecutors in their investigations, 
since it saves resources and may bring a quick end to the investigation.70  
Nevertheless, where the requests for cooperation have created a “culture of 
cooperation” at the expense of fundamental rights of employees, the ques-
tion becomes whether the DOJ has struck the constitutionally appropriate 
balance.71  The tension created between the companies’ interest to avoid 
criminal charges, and the vulnerability of their employees who find 
 
66. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part VI.B. (footnote omitted). 
67. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1233 (noting that employees may be deprived of 
their right to assert the Fifth Amendment right when they are not informed of the company’s 
intent to disclose all information gathered during an internal investigation to the government). 
68. Couden, supra note 5, at 421. 
69. See, e.g., Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1170-71 (explaining that given limited govern-
ment resources, the government benefits from offering companies incentives for their cooperation, 
and such offers also promote a “real-time enforcement,” which leads to an increase in both 
numbers and pace of investigations). 
70. The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate 
Investigations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., S. Hrg. 109-835, 
Serial No. J-109-108, 2, 3 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Thompson Memo Hearing] (statement of 
Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, Paul J. McNulty). 
71. Marvin G. Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in Tough Spot: 
Are ‘Cooperating’ Companies Violating Constitutional Rights?, 236 N.Y.L.J. 2, 2 (July 24, 2006), 
available at http://www.akerman.com/documents/Pickholz%20White20Collar%20NYLJ%207-
24-06.pdf. 
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themselves “sold” to the government, is a valid concern.72  Companies may 
overly expose their employees and provide the government with an 
increased share of employees’ inculpatory statements or false exculpatory 
statements made during internal investigations.73 
Recently, these criticisms have received judicial support in United 
States v. Stein,74 where certain aspects of the Thompson Memo were ruled 
unconstitutional.75  Among the most pressing concerns voiced by critics is 
the focus on the assisting-role played by capitulating companies in the 
realm of government investigations.76  In practice, this approach has led to 
extreme criticisms of the prosecutorial practices for allowing, and some-
times even requesting companies to do the government’s job by conducting 
internal investigations and disclosing their findings to the federal prose-
cutors.77  Therefore, these guidelines have appeared to give a pass to federal 
prosecutors to obtain information through certain questionable economies, 
such as the companies’ internal investigations and identification of culpable 
individuals.78  This has facilitated the prosecutors’ work because they could 
gain access to evidence without dependence on traditional means, such as 
grand jury subpoenas and conferral of immunity.79  Proponents of the 
Thompson Memo have argued that companies are not coerced into waiving 
 
72. See Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals 
of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson Over Turf, the Choice of 
Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
443, 477 (2003-04) (noting that companies are penalized for assisting employees or senior 
executives under investigation). 
73. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1181 (enumerating criticism of the Thompson Memo 
with regard to the strain it causes on relationships between companies and employees). 
74. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
75. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (finding the Thompson Memo unconstitutional to the extent 
that the government pressured and coerced KPMG to withhold advancement of legal fees and 
defense costs for employees on the threat of refusing to grant them “cooperator” status).  For a 
more thorough examination, see infra Part IV.C. (discussing the parties’ arguments and the Stein 
holding). 
76. See Oesterle, supra note 72, at 477 (noting that for a company to gain cooperation credit 
it must do the government’s job in finding the culpable individuals and turning them in); see also 
Comey Interview, supra note 6, at 2 (“For a corporation to get credit for cooperation, it must help 
the Government catch the crooks.”). 
77. John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men: Corporate Lawyers Worry that They’re Doing the 
Government’s Bidding While Doing Internal Investigations, 89 A.B.A.J., 46, 46 (June 2003); see 
also N. Richard Janis, Taking the Stand: Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal 
Government: How Our Adversary System of Justice is Being Destroyed (Mar. 2005), available at 
http://dcbar.org/for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/march_2005/stand.cfm (criticizing the govern-
ment’s emphasis on cooperation, alleging that prosecutors are given extraordinary powers over 
companies under investigation). 
78. David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death 
of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 156-57 (2000). 
79. Id. at 148, 156. 
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privileges and turning in culpable employees.80  However, as evidenced by 
the collapse, in 2002, of Arthur Andersen LLP, one of the world’s oldest 
and largest accounting firms, a criminal indictment instead of cooperation 
with the government can lead to a corporate death penalty.81  Therefore, in 
similar cases, it is naïve to pretend that companies are free to choose 
between cooperation and indictment.82  Often, the potential consequences of 
indictment and bankruptcy determine the choice.83  The company surren-
ders under the government’s powers, “and consequently, strip[s] [the] proc-
ess of its adversarial nature.”84  In succumbing to the role of investigative 
agents for the government, companies may be creating equally threatening 
problems, including jeopardizing their relationship with their employees.85 
The fiduciary employer-employee relationship would certainly be 
endangered if employees understood that their company’s internal investi-
gation was actually an effort to secure cooperation credit from the govern-
ment at their expense.86  In such a scenario, if trust were absent, both the 
accuracy of any information provided to the investigators, as well as future 
critical business information exchanges necessary for effective corporate 
decision-making would be questionable.87 
Moreover, companies who seek to obtain information that will later be 
turned over to the government, in an effort to portray authentic cooperation, 
fail to advise employees that the content of their interviews for the purposes 
of internal investigations will be disclosed to the government.88  They also 
tend to fail to provide counsel to employees subjected to such interviews.89  
It is therefore questionable whether such methods conform to constitutional 
 
80. See Mary Beth Buchannan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the 
Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 610 (2004) (arguing that the waiver 
of privileges is voluntary and the arguments that the Thompson Memo principles erode the 
attorney-client privilege are overstated). 
81. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1229. 
82. See id. (noting that today’s companies’ choice between “life and death” often means 
acting as government’s agents in its investigations). 
83. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1641, 1648 (2006) (noting the negative impact of criminal indictments on a corporation’s 
reputation to the point at which the corporation declares bankruptcy). 
84. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1229. 
85. Id. at 1230. 
86. Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The Government in the Employer-Employee 
Relationship, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 803 (2002). 
87. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual 
Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1092 
(2006) (pointing out reports from companies and corporate lawyers that corporate employees no 
longer are willing to communicate with corporate lawyers because they lack a reasonable 
assurance of confidentiality). 
88. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1232. 
89. Id. 
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provisions.90  According to the DOJ, these are not real concerns because 
only guilty employees would choose to refrain from being interviewed, 
while “[e]mployees who have only made mistakes will understand.”91  
Nevertheless, the slippery slope is apparent, especially since the employees 
may not know that the government is involved, or may lack knowledge as 
to the exact area of the government’s interest.92  Under such premises, 
“innocent” employees could also face the risk of adverse employment 
action, as well as indictment for obstruction of justice, even if no federal 
agent was present during the employees’ interviews.93  By effectively 
“deputizing” companies to act on behalf of the government, the company is 
said to act under “color of law” during interviews with its employees.94  
This interpretation follows from several developments within the context of 
white-collar crime investigations.95  The Thompson Memo contained lan-
guage implicitly stating that prosecutors, when assessing a company’s 
complete cooperation with the investigators, must take into account a 
company’s willingness to take certain punitive actions against employees 
and other agents during the time of the investigation.96  The net result has 
 
90. See generally id. at 1225-26 (noting employees’ constitutional rights may be disregarded 
in attempts by corporations to avoid criminal indictments). 
91. Comey Interview, supra note 6, at 3. 
92. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 2.  One of the criteria used by some federal 
prosecutors in determining whether there is “authentic” cooperation is whether the company kept 
the subject of the government’s interest from the employees during their interviews.  Id. 
93. Id.; see also Daniel Bookin et al., Obstruction of Justice Under Computer Associates: 
Legal, Tactical and Ethical Implications for Attorneys Conducting Internal Investigations, 1564 
PLI/Corp 259, 263-64 n 3, 273 (Aug. 2006) (citing United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 
Cr. No. 04-837 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) and United States v. Singleton, CR-06-080, CR-04-514 (S.D. 
Tex. 2006)).  These cases support the position that corporate counsel conducting internal 
investigations are “deputized” federal agents.  Id. In both cases false, misleading statements and 
omissions to corporate counsel were criminalized under a statute that prohibits obstructing the 
work of federal agents.  Id. 
94. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 78, at 147 (referring to the “deputizing of ‘Corporate 
America’” though the shift in prosecutorial attitude, nowadays demanding full disclosure of all 
relevant evidence to the investigation of corporate malfeasance); see also Pickholz & Pickholz, 
supra note 71, at 2 (arguing that companies who conduct internal investigations with the intent to 
surrender any findings to the government act under “color of law” during employees’ interviews). 
95. See Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 2-3 (listing developments occurring in 
corporate prosecutions over the past five to eight years).  Such developments include: (a) the 
Holder and Thompson Memoranda and the requirement of “authentic” cooperation; (b) the 
coercive threat of prosecution coupled with the overt or implied promise of leniency in exchange 
of complete cooperation; (c) the company’s understanding of these practical realities at the outset 
of the internal investigation and that the company will in fact be turning over its internal employee 
interview notes to the prosecutors; (d) the Hobson’s choice facing employees of giving an 
interview to their employer of being terminated; and (e) the potential for the employee to be 
criminally indicted for obstruction of justice or impeding a government investigation.  Id. 
96. See Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part VI.B. (stating that the Thompson Memo 
encourages prosecutors to deny cooperation credit to business organizations that assist or support 
“culpable employees and agents”). 
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become a demand for waiver of the employees’ Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination as a condition of continued employment.97  Addi-
tionally, it was argued that it resulted in a waiver of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, and the ability to be free from government interference in 
obtaining and using lawful resources in the preparation of a defense.98  In 
2006, the government responded with a slight revision to its practices. 
C. THE MCNULTY MEMO 
In the wake of increased criticism to the Thompson Memo, in 
December 2006, Deputy U.S. Attorney General Paul McNulty announced 
the revision of the Thompson Memo.99  Although this new memorandum 
supersedes and replaces the Thompson Memo, the critical point will be its 
implementation by DOJ.100  It is probably too early to predict whether the 
McNulty Memo differs significantly from its predecessors. 
The McNulty Memo largely restates the principles of prosecution 
outlined in the Thompson Memo.101  However, it has also introduced a 
different approach to prosecution requests for privileged materials and 
interference with the payment of attorney’s fees.102  With respect to the 
latter, the new policy states that “prosecutors generally should not take into 
account” advancement of legal fees as a sign of non-cooperation,103 except 
in “extremely rare cases.”104  Further, the McNulty Memo advises prose-
cutors to consider such advancement only where “the totality of the 
circumstances show[s] that it was intended to impede a criminal 
investigation[,]” and adds a procedural requirement—the prosecutors must 
first obtain approval from the Deputy Attorney General.105 
 
97. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1228 (commenting on the DOJ’s approach that 
companies that do not fire employees who refuse to be interviewed are not acting in their 
shareholders’ interests). 
98. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d, 330, 361 (concluding that the right to be free 
from government interference in preparing a defense is part of our concept of fair play and 
justice); see also Mark H. Alcott, Promoting Needed Reform, Defending Core Values, 78 N.Y. ST. 
B.J. 5, 6 (Oct. 2006) (commenting that the government’s attitude that a company that helps its 
employees to defend themselves is deemed uncooperative, constitutes an interference with 
constitutional and fundamental concepts of our legal system). 
99. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at 2. 
100. SecActions.com, The McNulty Memo Replaces Thompson—But Is There Any Real 
Change?, http://www.secactions.com/?p=128 (last visited May 15, 2007). 
101. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 316 (2007). 
102. MCNULTY MEMO, supra note 12, at Part VII.B.3. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at VII.B.3, n.3. 
105. Id. 
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These restrictions, however, may, in practice, have a limited effect, 
consequently frustrating the goals and benefits of the new policies.  As the 
Memo explains, this new policy “is not meant to prevent a prosecutor from 
asking questions about an attorney’s representation of a corporation or its 
employees”106 and that questions about “how and by whom attorney’s fees 
are paid” are “appropriate.”107  Moreover, even if the Memo states that 
prosecutors cannot hold the advancement of legal fees against a corporate 
target except in very rare cases, it does not explicitly exclude the possibility 
that prosecutors may still look favorably on a corporation’s refusal to 
advance fees.  Although the Memo contains the same prohibition as out-
lined in the Thompson Memo on counting advancement against a corpora-
tion when such is required by law or contract,108 it does not provide any 
guidelines as to how prosecutors should treat a corporation that advances 
fees even when such advancement is not required by any statutory or 
contractual obligation.  Therefore, it could be argued that the prohibition on 
considering advancement against a corporation target only applies when the 
advancement is obligatory.109  Considering that business organizations fac-
ing federal investigations most probably want to avoid federal prosecution, 
allowing prosecutors to even raise the topic by asking questions regarding 
the advancement or grant preferential treatment to corporations that “volun-
tarily” refuse to advance legal fees may simply be enough of an incentive 
for corporations who want to curry favor with prosecutors to do so.110 
Moreover the standard for allowing prosecutors to consider a 
corporation’s advancement of legal fees to its officers and employees—
when advancement is done in furtherance of impeding the government’s 
investigation—may be too easily met.111  It appears that prosecutors are 
afforded a rather broad discretion in concluding that a corporation attempts 
to obstruct a criminal investigation through advancement of legal fees to its 
officers and employees112—it is unclear what other type of conduct 
 
106. Id. at Part VII.B.3. 
107. Id. at Part VII.B. n.4. 
108. Id. at Part VII.B. 
109. See Richard Janis, The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing (Feb. 2007), 
available at http://www.dcbar.org.for_lawyers/resources/publigations/Washington_lawyer/ 
February_2007/stand.cfm (arguing that the McNulty Memo’s new policy that prosecutors 
generally should not hold the advancement of legal fees against a corporation is troublesome 
because in most cases corporations are permitted and not obligated to advance attorney’s fees to 
employees or agents under investigation).  
110. SecActions.com, supra note 102. 
111. Id. 
112. Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the 
Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Conference Regarding the Department’s Charging 
Guidelines in Corporate Fraud Prosecutions (Dec. 12, 2006) available at 
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prosecutors are to consider under the totality of circumstances test.  Thus, 
there is a risk that the government may conclude that the advancement of 
legal fees was improper just because the corporation has engaged in other 
types of conduct aimed at obstruction generally.  Additionally, the new 
policy, although binding on the prosecutor during an investigation, does not 
provide any remedy per se if a prosecutor were to deviate from it,113 which 
could further corrode the procedural requirements. 
Nevertheless, Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty maintains that 
prosecutors, although allowed to retain discretion in scrutinizing advance-
ment of legal fees under the new Memo, will continue to exercise this 
discretion only in rare cases.114 According to McNulty, the “advancement 
of attorneys’ fees has always been a rare consideration in [the govern-
ment’s] corporate prosecutions.”115  Time will tell whether the McNulty 
Memo is successful in returning the pendulum back to equilibrium in the 
prosecution of corporate malfeasance.  Until then, the concerns earlier 
mentioned with respect to prosecutorial conduct under the Thompson 
Memo and possible violations of constitutional rights remain valid. The 
rights at issue rest at the core of our judicial system and their erosion in the 
corporate investigations context is alarming.116  Therefore, discussion of 
corporate officers’ and employees’ constitutional rights in the context of 
corporate investigations becomes necessary.117 
 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_061212.htm [hereinafter McNulty 
Remarks] (“[F]ee advancement can be considered where the totality of the circumstances show[s] 
that it was intended to impede a government investigation.”). 
113. Marcia Coyle, The McNulty Memo: Real Change, or Retreat?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 18, 
2006, at 25.  
114. McNulty Remarks, supra note 114. 
115. Id. But see generally United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 341-44 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (criticizing the prosecutors’ scrutiny of the organization’s advancement of legal fees to its 
officers and employees); Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to Pay Staff Legal Fees, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at B1 (noting three cases where prosecutors reportedly scrutinized 
payments of attorney’s fees). 
116. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4-10 (expressing concern 
over the prosecutorial policies because they erode the constitutional and other rights of current and 
former employees). 
117. Id. 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL 
PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Generally, employees cannot invoke the right against self-incrimination 
during a corporation’s internal investigation.118  However, because corpora-
tions often surrender the results from internal investigations to federal 
investigators in hopes of cooperation credit, the suggestion that employees 
should be advised of the right against self-incrimination prior to their inter-
view is reasonable.119  Moreover, the right to counsel may be affected by a 
corporation’s decision not to advance legal fees or expenses to employees 
deemed “culpable” by the government.120  This would probably not amount 
to any significant problems and could be considered as a corporation’s 
prerogative.121  However, when the corporation’s decision to deny advance-
ment is due to government interference, constitutional concerns arise.122 
A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT 
The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”123  Thus, within the 
criminal context, a defendant is afforded the right to refuse to testify against 
himself or herself.124  The trier of fact is forbidden from drawing adverse 
inferences from that silence.125  Further, the United States Supreme Court’s 
definition of the right to silence includes not only the individual right not to 
involuntary testify against himself or herself, but also the right not to 
answer questions, in either civil or criminal proceedings, which may incri-
minate him or her in future criminal proceedings.126  Moreover, the Court 
has also stated that the privilege “protects against any disclosure that the 
 
118. John F. Savarese & Carol Miller, Protecting Privilege and Dealing Fairly with 
Employees While Conducting an Internal Investigation, 1367 PLI/Corp 1027, 1068 (Apr.-June 
2003). 
119. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1231. 
120. See generally United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 367-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(finding employees’ right to counsel was violated when the employer stopped advancing legal fees 
to several employees who in the DOJ’s opinion were culpable of tax fraud). 
121. Id. 
122. See id. at 365 (explaining that the Stein court found the corporation’s decision was due 
to pressure exercised by the DOJ). 
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
124. Leftkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973). 
125. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (prohibiting the judge and 
prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that defendant’s silence can be used as substantive 
evidence of guilt). 
126. Leftkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77 (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)). 
      
784 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:767 
witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or 
could lead to other evidence that might be so used.”127  To invoke Fifth 
Amendment protection, the defendant’s statements must be compelled, 
testimonial, and incriminating.128 
For some of the Framers, the concept of “compelled” was tangential to 
torture.129  In the context of corporate governmental investigations, the 
economic hardship and psychological pressure exercised upon employees 
who may want to exercise their right to silence could reach the torture 
analogy.130  Moreover, it is questionable whether the government should be 
allowed to use employees’ statements given during internal investigations, 
especially when their constitutional rights are implicated.131  However, 
prosecutors have been afforded a broad discretion; for example, the 
Thompson Memo has provided the ground for federal prosecutors’ 
expectations that corporate counsel will act as their deputies.132 
It is well established that a business organization cannot assert a Fifth 
Amendment privilege, and employees cannot withhold corporate docu-
ments that may incriminate them as individuals.133  Moreover, each em-
ployee owes a duty of cooperation to his or her employer, the expectation of 
which is broad enough to include the duty to consent to an interview with 
corporate counsel.134  Nevertheless, the question becomes whether the 
employees’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is violated 
when the corporation is acting under “color of law” by conducting internal 
 
127. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972). 
128. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 904 (1995). 
129. Id. at 865 n.20. 
130. See Thomas O. Gorman, An Outline: DOJ and SEC Standards on Cooperation, 1581 
PLI/Corp 887, 906 (Jan. 2007) (noting that because of the vagueness of the prosecutorial policies, 
the threat of termination would affect anyone remotely associated with the questionable conduct). 
131. Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 126 (statement of Former U.S. Att’y Gen. 
Edwin Meese).  Former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese opines that the government should 
not be allowed to do indirectly what it is not allowed to do directly, referring to the phenomenon 
of “deputizing corporate America.”  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
132. Id., at 135-36 (testimony of Mark B. Sheppard, Partner Sprague & Sprague). 
[Corporate] counsel is expected to encourage employees to give statements without 
asserting their Fifth Amendment rights and without obtaining independent counsel. . . .  
[And][i]f the employee refuses, he or she faces termination with no apparent recog-
nition of the inherent unfairness of meting out punishment for the mere invocation of a 
constitutional right. 
Id. 
133. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1988) (holding corporate 
documents can be used against their custodians as evidence of culpability). 
134. See Savarese & Miller, supra note 118, at 1068 (“[A] duty to cooperate obligates an 
employee to comply with reasonable directions from the employer during an internal 
investigation.”). 
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investigations.135  This is especially alarming when the results are then 
turned over to the government in exchange for leniency, especially since the 
Fifth Amendment applies to the actions of a private entity that are found to 
be “‘fairly attributable’” to the government.136  Given the strong emphasis 
placed on “corporate cooperation,” it appears evident that, at least in some 
cases, a company has in effect no choice but to succumb to what it per-
ceives to be government coercion.137  Corporations are induced into trading 
their officers and employees for the federal prosecutors’ leniency in their 
charging decisions.138  This presents significant implications for corporate 
employees as far as their constitutional rights are concerned.139 
Interestingly, the DOJ does not appear to be hesitant or concerned 
about such results.140  Instead, the “government now expects companies, in 
essence, to deputize law firms and accounting firms to do the Government’s 
work for them,” and to demand a waiver of the employee’s Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination as a condition of continued employ-
ment.141  Such an approach is contrary to the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court has found that the government itself cannot make such a 
demand on its own employees.142  However, in the context of corporate 
investigations, the government still equates employees’ statements to 
corporate counsel during internal investigations to statements made to the 
government itself.143  Therefore, it seems logical that there should be no 
legitimate basis for penalizing an employee, either through termination or 
 
135. See Bookin et al., supra note 93, at 273-76 (considering the ramifications of internal 
investigations on the employees’ Fifth Amendment rights). 
136. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 3 (quoting D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc. v. NASD 
Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2002)).  The Cromwell court held that a sufficiently 
close nexus between the actions of the private entity and the government exists “where the state 
has exercised coercive power [over a private decision] or has provided such significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 
State.”  D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc., 279 F.3d at 161. 
137. See Mary Joe White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, 1517 
PLI/Corp 815, 820 (Nov. 2005) (noting that some prosecutors, often at the beginning of an 
investigation, automatically “grade” a corporation’s cooperation with the investigators). 
138. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1225. 
139. Id. 
140. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1170-71 (observing that federal investigators will 
continue to pressure companies). 
141. Janis, supra note 77. 
142. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (holding that use of the threat of 
discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against an employee is not allowed) (citing Slochower 
v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 641 (1956)).  The Slochower court held a public 
school teacher could not be discharged for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights when questioned 
by a Congressional committee.  See Slochower, 350 U.S. at 557-58 (“The privilege against self-
incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent 
either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury.”). 
143. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 2. 
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refusal of advancement of legal fees, due to an assertion of his or her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.144 
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a vital safeguard in criminal 
proceedings.145  Given the complicated nature of federal corporate investi-
gations, employees have an extreme interest in assuring an effective 
defense.146  Determining whether an employee benefits from an effective 
defense is measured by considering general principles, coupled with the 
right to counsel.147  This analysis is connected to the concern that 
corporations’ denial of advancement of legal fees at the “whim” of the 
government, in effect, violates the right to counsel.148 
1. General Principles Coupled with the Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his 
defence.”149  While the right to counsel clause has been found to include a 
right to competent counsel,150 it does not entitle a criminal defendant to 
have “an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own 
choosing.”151  Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
one element of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right of a 
defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will 
represent him.152  This right, however, is secured provided that the defen-
dant has the means to hire counsel at his or her own choosing, or the chosen 
 
144. Id. 
145. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1231 (arguing that it is only when employees 
are fairly advised by counsel representing their interests, that they can make an informed choice as 
to their participation in the investigations). 
146. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that 
to prepare and try a case involving corporate misconduct requires substantial resources). 
147. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“[T]he right to counsel is the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel.”). 
148. See, e.g., Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (holding that the government’s interference with 
the defendants’ advancement of legal fees violated their constitutional right to counsel). 
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A 
Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1637-57 (2003) (presenting 
the evolution of the right to counsel). 
150. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (1984) (recognizing that “the right to counsel is the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel”); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Effective Assistance of 
Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380, 1380 
(1983) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment 
includes the right to a counsel capable of mounting a competent defense). 
151. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). 
152. Unites States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561 (2006). 
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counsel is willing to represent the defendant even though he or she cannot 
afford to pay.153  In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,154 the 
United States Supreme Court considered a defendant’s ability to choose 
counsel imposed by economic constraints and the extent to which the right 
to counsel includes the right to use a third party’s assets.155  Thus, a claim 
of violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would probably be 
unsuccessful if the main argument were based on lack of funds without a 
showing of a right to those funds.156  Further, a claim of a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel violation generally requires a showing of prejudice.157 
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez,158 held that the requirement of showing prejudice established in 
Strickland is not necessary where the defendant has been deprived of the 
privilege of choosing counsel.159  The Court found that the: 
Deprivation of the right [to counsel of choice] is “complete” when 
the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by 
the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation 
he received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to counsel 
of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of 
comparative effectiveness—with the right to effective counsel—
which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever 
lawyer is chosen or appointed.160 
As the holding indicates, this could provide some support for corporate 
defendants who claim that by being denied payment of their legal 
representation, they are deprived of counsel of choice.161  Such an argument 
would be fairly persuasive, especially where the advancement was part of 
 
153. Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1989)). 
154. 491 U.S. 617 (1989). 
155. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 626.  The Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment “does not go beyond ‘the individual’s right to spend his own money to 
obtain the advice and assistance of . . . counsel.’”  Id.  “A defendant has no Sixth Amendment 
right to spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are 
the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice.”  Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 687 (1984).  The Supreme Court held that 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by a two-prong test requiring the 
defendant to show: (1) that the attorney’s performance was deficient, falling below professional 
standards of competence; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Id. 
158. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). 
159. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563. 
160. Id. 
161. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that 
the government had interfered with the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel of choice 
without a showing of prejudice). 
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the employment contract.162  However, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attaches only at a certain stage in a criminal procedure, which may 
make it more difficult in cases where the legal fees were incurred prior to 
this critical stage.163 
The United States Supreme Court previously interpreted the Sixth 
Amendment right to attach at the time of formal judicial proceedings.164  
With respect to the government’s conduct post-indictment, the Supreme 
Court has held that “to refuse to recognize the right to counsel for fear that 
counsel will obstruct the course of justice is contrary to the basic assump-
tion upon which [this Court] has operated in Sixth Amendment cases.”165  
However, the question of government interference, as per the federal prose-
cutorial guidelines, could occur prior to an indictment, thus begging the 
question of whether the right to counsel vests pre-indictment.166  For white-
collar practitioners such a right would be invaluable, especially because of 
the common feeling that white-collar crime cases are either won or lost 
during the pre-indictment stage.167  Nevertheless, there is no court decision 
recognizing that such a right is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. 
Therefore, the DOJ’s approach in corporate investigations presents 
society with a dilemma concerning the right to counsel in governmental 
investigations of business organizations: protection of employees’ civil 
rights or reduction of corporate fraud at any cost.168  This dilemma specif-
ically impacts the right to counsel in the federal investigations of business 
 
162. Id. 
163. See generally Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 136 (testimony of Mr. Mark 
B. Sheppard, Partner, Sprague & Sprague) (testifying about the importance of effective assistance 
of counsel in the investigatory stage). 
164. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel does not attach until after initiation of adversary judicial proceedings); United 
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 185-90 (1984) (holding that the right to appointment of counsel 
attaches only at or after institutions of adversary judicial proceeding); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion) (finding that a defendant’s right to counsel attaches only at or 
after time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him “whether by way of 
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”); Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964) (holding a defendant has the right to counsel from the time of 
arraignment). 
165. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967). 
166. Stephanie A. Martz, Report From the Front Lines: The Thompson Memorandum and 
the KPMG Tax Shelter Case, WALL ST. LAW., Aug. 2006, at 5.  
167. See Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 136 (testimony of Mark B. Sheppard, 
Partner, Sprague & Sprague) (arguing that effective assistance of counsel in the investigatory state 
is critical). 
168. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at n.19 (observing that after the issuance of the 
Thompson Memo, the number of corporate criminal prosecutions decreased); see generally United 
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding certain aspects of the 
Thompson Memo unconstitutional). 
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organizations.169  When assessing the extent of a company’s cooperation, 
the federal prosecutorial guidelines have permitted prosecutors to consider 
whether the company is protecting employees under investigation through 
the advancement of legal fees.170  In United States v. Stein, the defendants 
claimed that their employer-company’s decision not to advance such fees 
was induced by governmental pressure and therefore amounted to a vio-
lation of the right to counsel.171  The defendants’ main argument was that 
they were deprived of lawful resources, which they needed in order to 
mount an effective defense given the complicated nature of the case.172 
The issue of advancement does not always have to give rise to claims 
of constitutional rights violations.173  Often, the advancement of legal fees 
or indemnification is regulated internally within the corporation.174  Both 
the Thompson Memo and McNulty Memo recognize that prosecutors 
should not hold the advancement against the corporation when such is done 
pursuant to state law or contractual obligation.175 
2. Advancement of Legal Fees in Theory and Practice 
Advancing legal fees differs from indemnification, which means the 
reimbursement by the company to its functionaries of liabilities incurred in 
the course of service to the company.176  Advancement means the company 
pays expenses incurred by an employee in advance of the final disposition 
of a legal matter upon the employee’s agreement to repay such amount.177  
Moreover, absent a charter, bylaw, or contractual provision to the contrary, 
the advancement of expenses prior to the final disposition of the legal ac-
tion is permissive, not mandatory.178 
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen,179 held 
that advancing legal fees is an integral part of good corporate 
 
169. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. at 367 (finding that government violated the employees’ right to 
counsel issuing memorandum providing that advancement of legal fees would be considered a 
negative factor in its investigation of the employer). 
170. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part VI.B. 
171. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336. 
172. Id. at 367. 
173. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 212 (Del. 2005) (considering the 
Delaware indemnification statute allowing corporations to specify by bylaw or contract the terms 
and conditions upon which advancement of legal fees may occur). 
174. Id. 
175. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at n.4; McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at Part 
VII.B.3. 
176. Savarese & Miller, supra note 118, at 1075. 
177. Id. at 1077. 
178. Id. 
179. 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005). 
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governance.180  By providing corporate officers and directors with funds for 
the costs incurred in investigations and litigation related to their conduct on 
behalf of the company, a company is acting in accordance with the princi-
ples of good corporate governance.181  Moreover, the practice of advance-
ment of legal fees is considered an incentive for attracting competent 
individuals into corporate service.182  A company’s advancement of legal 
fees may not be construed as a blank check offered unconditionally to 
“culpable” employees.183  Nevertheless, the DOJ does not appear to recog-
nize the fact that a company normally would require the employee for 
whom it advances legal fees, to repay such advancements in the event the 
employee is not entitled to such.184 
In a footnote, the Thompson Memo’s commandment, with respect to 
the advancement of legal fees, did state that in some instances a company 
may be required to advance such fees either under its bylaws or state law.185  
A similar provision is included in the McNulty Memo.186  Also, the Holder 
Memo contained a similar provision.187  Nevertheless, Holder’s approach to 
the advancement issue had been a target of criticism as undermining a legal, 
ethical, and useful practice.188 
A decision to advance fees often must be made before there is a 
sufficient factual basis to allow a company to assess the “culpability” of an 
employee.189 Therefore, critics argued that the Holder approach could lead 
companies to take a defensive approach and prejudge an employee’s crimi-
nal intent and conduct, thereby limiting the company’s exercise of discre-
tion to advance fees.190  Moreover, prosecutors often abused the Holder ap-
proach by interfering with corporate employees’ ability to retain competent 
 
180. Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d at 211. 
181. See id. (finding that high-quality corporate services are ensured by protecting corporate 
officers’ and employees’ personal financial resources from exhaustion by legal expenses incurred 
during an investigation or litigation resulting from the rendering of such services). 
182. Id.; Dale A. Osterle, Limits on a Corporation’s Protection of Its Directors and Officers 
from Personal Liability, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 513, 514-16. 
183. David H. Kristenbroker et al., Criminal and Civil Investigations: United States v. Stein 
and Related Issues, 1557 PLI/Corp 483, 493 (Sept. 2006). 
184. See id. (pointing out that the DOJ is somewhat conditioned by its “increasingly 
aggressive anti-indemnification policies”). 
185. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, n.4.  “Some states require corporations to pay the le-
gal fees of officers under investigation prior to a formal determination of their guilt.  Obviously, a 
corporation’s compliance with governing law should not be considered a failure to cooperate.”  Id. 
186. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at Part VII.B.3. 
187. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at VII.B.3, n.3. 
188. American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and 
Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 335-36 (2003). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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counsel absent financial support from their employer, thus gaining a 
strategic advantage in the investigations.191 
Prosecutors are obligated not to interfere with an individual’s legal 
representation, particularly in a criminal matter.192  The United States 
Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,193 held: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartiality is as compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.194 
In light of this, white-collar criminal defense lawyers were unhappy 
with the Holder Memo’s approach to the advancing of legal fees.195  They 
argued that the Holder Memo’s approach created a framework that allowed 
a prosecutor to interfere with an employee’s ability to obtain a well-
qualified lawyer, which thereby undermines the interests of justice.196  
These concerns persist because the newer federal prosecutorial guidelines 
have not changed the methodology advanced by their predecessor.197  The 
concerns were further discussed in the Stein case, which has since given rise 
to debates also in the United States Senate.198 
C. UNITED STATES V. STEIN (I) 
In United States v. Stein, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York showed a strong dissatisfaction with the 
Thompson Memo’s approach to the advancement of legal fees.199  “Stein 
represents the first time the constitutionality of the Thompson Memo or its 
 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 338 n.128 (explaining that under the McDade Amendment from 1998, a federal 
prosecutor must adhere to state ethics rules (citing 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a))). 
193. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
194. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. 
195. American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 188, at 338. 
196. Id. 
197. See generally Janis, supra note 77 (arguing that no positive effects flow from the 
Thompson Memo); see also Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the 
Corporate Response, 1671 PLI/Corp 331, 368 (Aug. 2007) (identifying the “carrot and stick” 
approach practiced under the Holder and Thompson Memos, which rewards cooperation and 
punishes non-compliance). 
198. See, e.g., Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 124 (statement of Former Att’y 
Gen., Edwin Meese, III) (discussing the Stein decision). 
199. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  The court 
dismissed almost all of the government’s legal arguments.  Id. 
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predecessor has been litigated in federal court.”200  In essence, the issue 
before the court was whether a company that refuses to advance legal fees 
to employees under investigation for corporate fraud, in an effort to receive 
cooperation credit, amounts to a denial of employees’ constitutional 
rights.201  The court answered this question affirmatively, finding that the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments protect a defendant’s right to obtain and use 
resources lawfully available to the defendant, free of knowing and reckless 
government interference.202 
1. Facts 
In 2002, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) referred a criminal 
investigation of Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) to the DOJ.203  
Prior to the referral, the IRS had conducted investigations of tax shelters 
created by KPMG.204  The DOJ referred the case to the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York to determine 
whether to indict KPMG and the alleged co-conspirators.205  KPMG’s 
lawyers went to great lengths to portray to federal prosecutors that it fully 
cooperated with the investigation, in order to convince the government not 
to indict the firm.206  In the negotiating process, prosecutors asked the 
KPMG lawyers whether KPMG intended to pay the attorney’s fees of 
current and former employees under investigation.207 
The court in Stein stated that prosecutors “deliberately, and consistent 
with DOJ policy, reinforced the threat inherent in the Thompson 
Memorandum” regarding payment of attorney’s fees.208  KPMG reacted by 
setting a limit to the amount of attorney’s fees that it would provide for 
employees in advance and by establishing policy that payment of fees 
would stop if the government indicted the employee.209  A short time after 
KPMG signed a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (hereinafter Agreement) 
 
200. Lawrence J. Zweichfach & Zachary S. Taylor, United States v. Stein and the 
Advancement of Attorney’s Fees: The Thompson Memorandum Under a Microscope, 1557 
PLI/Corp 903, 907 (Sept. 2006). 
201. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (stating that the issue before the court “arises at an 
intersection of three principles of American law”). 
202. Id. at 372. 
203. Id. at 338. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 339. 
206. Id. at 341-42. 
207. Id. at 342. 
208. Id. at. 352. 
209. Id. 
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with the government, the targeted employees were indicted, and as agreed, 
KPMG stopped paying their legal fees.210 
In January 2006, the indicted KPMG employees asked the court to 
dismiss their indictments.211  They claimed their constitutional rights had 
been violated as a result of the prosecutors’ improper interference with 
KPMG’s practice of advancing attorney’s fees.212  The court ordered a 
hearing on the issue of whether the evidence showed that the government 
interfered with and affected KPMG’s decisions with respect to advancing 
legal fees.213 
2. Summary of the Defendants’ Legal Arguments 
Stein and the other defendants asserted that federal prosecutors used 
the Thompson Memo in their negotiations with KPMG to frighten the firm 
into ending its longstanding policy of paying its partners’ and employees’ 
legal fees in proceedings arising from conduct within the scope of their 
employment.214  The defendants strongly criticized the Thompson Memo in 
their briefs.215  Defendant Stein argued that the prosecutors lacked any clear 
standard for their determination of who is a “culpable” employee not 
entitled to fee advancement.216  Instead, the prosecutors are free to use their 
own criteria as to what constitutes a “culpable” employee.217  In sum, the 
defendants alleged violation of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.218  
Their arguments built upon the perceived shortfalls of the Thompson Memo 
and the prosecutors’ conduct governed by it.219 
a. The Fifth Amendment Violation 
The main argument concerning the alleged violation of the right to a 
fair trial revolved around the Thompson Memo and the particular conduct 
of the prosecutors in the case.220  The defendants’ claims of Fifth 
 
210. Id. at 349-50. 
211. Id. at 350. 
212. Id.  
213. Id. at 352. 
214. Brief of Petitioners-Defendants at 4, United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 888 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioners-Defendants]. 
215. See, e.g., id. at 14 (arguing that the prosecution violated their constitutional rights when 
it acted in accordance with the Thompson Memo). 
216. Brief of Petitioner-Defendant at 22-23, United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 888 
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Defendant Stein’s Brief]. 
217. Id. 
218. Brief of Petitioners-Defendants, supra note 214, at 14-19. 
219. Id. 
220. See, e.g., Defendant Stein’s Brief, supra note 216, at 6 (arguing that the government 
violated both substantive and procedural due process). 
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Amendment infringement were premised on the belief that they had a 
constitutionally protected property interest in the advancement of fees.221  
Thus, the defendants argued that the government’s conduct amounted to a 
“gross abuse of governmental authority” violating their substantive due 
process rights. 222  However, defendant Stein argued in the alternative that, 
even if there was no violation of substantive due process, the government 
failed to give him adequate notice required under the procedural due 
process.223 
b. The Sixth Amendment Violation 
Defendant Stein acknowledged that “the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel typically attaches at indictment.”224  Nevertheless, he argued that 
the government imposed an impermissible burden on this right by 
interfering with his ability to retain and fund attorneys at critical stages of 
the investigation.225  According to Stein, the evidence demonstrated that the 
government invoked the Thompson Memo after being told by KPMG that 
the firm was unsure of its obligations to pay fees.226  The government 
allegedly informed KPMG that it would “microscopically scrutinize any 
discretionary decision to pay fees to persons who . . . were ‘culpable.’”227  
Further, defendant Weisner maintained, “that the government’s interference 
with defendants’ rights, although starting prior to the initiation of formal 
charges, was a continuing violation since the withholding of fees continued 
post-indictment.”228 
 
221. Id. at 6-7.  Defendant Stein argued that a contract implied-in-fact existed between the 
individual defendants and KPMG by virtue of the firm’s longstanding policy of always advancing 
fees under similar circumstances.  Id. at 8. In Stein’s case there was an express contractual 
obligation made by KPMG to pay his legal fees under the terms of his separation agreement.  Id. 
at 12. 
222. Id. at 6 (quoting Harlen Ass. v. Inc. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 
2001)). 
223. Id. at 24. 
224. Id. at 17. 
225. Id.  Stein argued that even if the defendants may not have been entitled to the assistance 
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment during the investigatory phase, the government was not 
authorized to interfere with their ability to retain counsel through contractual arrangements with 
KPMG.  Id. 
226. Defendant Stein’s Brief, supra note 216, at 21. 
227. Id. (arguing that the government’s express warning to KPMG with respect to the issue 
of fee advancement, was that “misconduct cannot be rewarded”). 
228. Zweichfach & Taylor, supra note 200, at 910.  Defendant Weisner argued “under 
Escobedo v. Illiois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that the 
right to counsel attached under the Fifth Amendment when the prosecutors determined that the 
defendants were ‘culpable’ and, guided by the Thompson Memorandum, coerced KPMG not to 
advance them legal fees.”  Id. 
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The defendants were clear in their arguments.  The prosecutors’ con-
duct during the negotiations with KPMG amounted to coercing KPMG into 
stopping the advancement of legal fees.229  Thus, in their view, the federal 
prosecutors had abused their power and discretion.230 
3. Summary of the Government’s Legal Arguments 
The government denied that its alleged conduct amounted to such out-
rageous conduct that it shocked the conscience, as is the required standard 
for a constitutional violation.231  It argued that, except with regard to 
defendant Stein, the claim of violation of procedural due process must fail 
because the other defendants could not establish the deprivation of a 
cognizable property interest in the advancement of fees.232  Moreover, the 
Government contended that given the nature of KPMG’s partnership 
agreement’s integration clause, the defendants’ claim of a separate implied-
in-fact contract to advance legal fees must fail.233 
The government pointed out that the right to counsel does not attach 
until the initiation of formal judicial proceedings.234  Further, no court has 
recognized a continuing or “anticipatory” violation based on pre-indictment 
government conduct.235  Moreover, the government interpreted and applied 
federal forfeiture case law as not including a defendant’s “right” to access 
third-party funds for his defense.236  Instead, the government argued that a 
defendant could only reach so far as his own funds will allow in obtaining 
the assistance of counsel.237  In the alternative, the government argued that 
even if a Sixth Amendment violation had occurred, the defendants could 
not show, as required by Strickland, that they were prejudiced by the 
violation, especially because they have been represented by competent 
counsel throughout the proceedings.238 
 
229. Brief of Petitioners-Defendants, supra note 214, at 4. 
230. Id. at 9. 
231. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 51, United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Government’s Post-Hearing Memorandum]. 
232. Id. at 54. 
233. Id. at 57. 
234. Id. at 75. 
235. Id. at 36. 
236. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 622 (1989); United States 
v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 601 (1989). 
237. Government’s Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 231, at 34. 
238. Id. at 47. 
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4. Summary of the Arguments of the Amici Curiae 
An impressive list of amici curiae filed several briefs in support of the 
defendants.239  The New York Council of Defense Lawyers and the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers supported the 
defendants’ claim that the federal prosecutors’ conduct violated both the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.240  The main argument was that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached when the government coerced KPMG 
to withhold legal fees from individuals that the government deemed 
“culpable.”241  Accordingly, the amici argued that the prosecutors, through 
the Thompson Memo, unduly interfered with this interest, thus depriving 
the defendants of counsel of choice.242  Due to the complex nature of the 
case, the amici contended that the government should have an equal 
concern for justice, which could only be ensured by subjecting the 
government’s case to the probing of a skilled counsel for the defense.243 
Further, the Securities Industry Association, the Association of 
Corporate Counsel, the Bond Market Association, and the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America filed an amici curiae brief in 
support of the defendants.244  The amici disapproved of the government’s 
approach toward advancement of legal fees as evidenced by the Thompson 
Memo.245  Additionally, they argued that without the advancement of fees, 
the prospect of indemnification does little to assist defendants to secure 
effective representation.246 
5. The Court’s Decision 
The Federal District Court made numerous findings.  First, the court 
concluded that KPMG departed from its settled practice of advancing legal 
fees and expenses incurred in investigations and cases to its officers and 
employees due to the government’s approach spelled out in the Thompson 
 
239. The list included: New York Council of Defense Lawyers (NYCDL); National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL); Securities Industry Association; Association 
of Corporate Counsel (ACC); Bond Market Association; Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America. 
240. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers and the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants, United States v. Stein, 435 F. 
Supp. 2d 330 (2006) (No. S1 05 Crim. 888) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae]. 
241. Id. at 10. 
242. Id. at Part I. 
243. Id. 
244. Brief for the Securities Industry Association, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants, United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. S1 05 Cr. 888). 
245. See generally id. at 12 (discussing the advantages of fee advancement). 
246. Id. 
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Memo.247  Second, the court found that the United States Attorney’s Office 
reinforced the inherent threat in the Thompson Memo with respect to 
KPMG’s inquiry as to whether payment of legal fees would be held against 
it.248  Third, the court concluded that the government’s conduct during the 
negotiations with KPMG was apparent evidence of the government’s desire 
to minimize the involvement of defense attorneys.249  The government over-
reached in interpreting that the Thompson Memo permitted prosecutors to 
instruct KPMG as to how to advise its employees about their needs for legal 
representation, and encouraged KPMG to depart from well-established past 
practice in paying fees.250  Fourth, the court found that the government 
applied direct pressure on KPMG and that the firm, as a consequence, 
decided to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone who 
was indicted and to limit and condition such payments prior to indictment 
upon cooperation with the government.251  Thus, the court found that the 
government violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by causing KPMG to 
cut off payments of legal fees and other defense costs upon indictment of 
the individual defendants.252 
After noting the significant importance of a defendant’s right to 
fairness in the criminal process, the court thoroughly reviewed the Due 
Process Clause requirements.253  The Federal District Court also maintained 
that because the consequences of a failed defense would negatively affect a 
defendant, there is a heightened need for ensuring fairness in criminal 
proceedings.254 The court was clearly concerned with the government’s 
conduct in the case at hand.255 
Regarding the alleged Fifth Amendment violation, the court agreed 
with the defendants’ position that the particular intricate nature of the case 
required “substantial resources.”256  The court also agreed that the 
 
247. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 353. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 356. 
253. Id. at 356-59. 
254. Id. at 358. 
255. Id.  The Stein court was direct yet subtle in its criticism of the government’s conduct 
evidenced by its choice of words.  Id.  For example, it stated that in criminal proceedings “the 
defendant [must] be firmly in the driver’s seat, and that the prosecution not be a backseat driver.”  
Id. 
256. Id. at 362 n.163.  Judge Kaplan calculated roughly that a six-month trial of 117 days 
where a defendant was represented by a single lawyer, who devoted eight hours for each trial day 
at a cost of $400 per hour, simply to attend the trial would cost $375,000.  Id.  However, given the 
five to six million pages of documents produced by the government, and the required time to 
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government interfered with the defendants’ ability to obtain resources they 
would otherwise have had.257  First, the court found that the provision in the 
Thompson Memo directing prosecutors to consider the advancement of 
legal fees to employees as indicative of corporate non-cooperation imposes 
an economic punishment before anyone has been found guilty of 
anything.258  According to the court, this was not a legitimate government 
interest but “an abuse of power.”259  Second, the court found the language 
of the provision to be too broad because the advancement of fees can be 
interpreted as “weigh[ing] against an organization independent of whether 
there is any ‘circling of the wagons.’”260  Finally, the court rejected the 
government’s argument that payment of legal fees is “relevant to gauging 
the extent of a company’s cooperation.”261  In accordance with the policy 
argument presented by the amici curiae, the court found that cooperation 
and advancement of fees are not necessarily inconsistent with each other.262  
In conclusion, the court found that this particular provision of the 
Thompson Memo excessively burdens the constitutional rights of the 
individual defendants, whose ability to defend themselves is impaired, and 
therefore violates the Due Process Clause.263 
The court further rejected the government’s claim that the individual 
defendants did not have any Sixth Amendment rights in this case.264  It 
found that the approach to advancement of fees, as contemplated by the 
Thompson Memo, undermined the proper functioning of the adversary 
process because it devalued “partisan advocacy on both sides of a case.”265  
Further, the court held that the chain of events set in motion prior to 
indictment had an actionable post-indictment effect.266  Ultimately, the 
court found that the government had interfered with the defendants’ rights 
 
prepare an appropriate defense, he thought it would be more reasonable to assume that even a 
minimal defense of this case could cost $500,000 to $1 million, if not significantly more.  Id. 
257. Id. at 362. 
258. Id. at 363. 
259. Id.  
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 364. 
262. Id.  “[A] company may pay at the same time that it does its best to bare its corporate 
soul, stands at the government’s beck and call to provide information and witnesses, and does a 
myriad of other things to aid the government and clean the corporate house.”  Id. 
263. Id. at 364-65. 
264. Id. at 366-67. 
265. Id. at 368. 
266. Id. at 366. “The fact that events were set in motion prior to indictment with the object of 
having, or with knowledge that they were likely to have, an unconstitutional effect upon indict-
ment cannot save the government.” Id. 
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to be represented as they choose, subject only to the constraints imposed by 
the resources lawfully available to them.267 
6. Implications of the Stein Decision 
The Federal Court’s June 2006 decision fanned the flame of criticism 
of the Thompson Memo.268  However, the decision is not binding on other 
courts, and applies only where a company has legal discretion to advance 
attorney’s fees.269  Even if it is unclear what the Stein decision’s long-term 
implications will be, for now, it should be noted that it is considered a 
useful guide for business organizations and corporate counsel contem-
plating an internal investigation of suspected misconduct and potential 
criminal prosecution.270  The decision somewhat levels the playing field 
between competing considerations of employees’ constitutional rights and 
companies’ self-preservation interests to cooperate with a federal criminal 
investigation to avoid a corporate “death sentence.”271 
Nevertheless, the DOJ’s corporate prosecutorial guidelines also present 
non-constitutional concerns.272  The demise of Arthur Andersen presents a 
good example of the consequences of prosecutors’ aggressive approach to 
criminal investigations.273  In light of this, public policy considerations may 




268. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (arguing that in addition to the 
waiver provisions, the Thompson Memo provision dealing with the advancement of legal fees 
strikes at the core of our adversarial system of justice). 
269. A corporation may be required to advance legal fees and expenses by its policies, by-
laws or employment contracts.  See, e.g., Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at VII.B. n.4.  In such 
cases, the government is not permitted to take the advancement into consideration in its charging 
decision.  See id. (listing the situations when prosecutors should not take advancement into 
account). 
270. Rebecca Walker, The Thompson Memo: Implications of the Stein Decision for 
Corporate Compliance, 1561 PLI/Corp 253, 255 (Sept. 2006). 
271. Id. at 261. 
272. See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
579, 632-33 (2005) (enumerating five ethical dilemmas for businesses). 
273. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing possible consequences to the federal government’s 
aggressive pursuit of corporate misconduct).   
274. See generally, Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 
IND. L.J. 473, 537 (2006) (arguing for a narrower standard of corporate criminal liability). 
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IV.  PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS 
REGARDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CORPORATE 
INVESTIGATIONS 
Federal prosecutors’ aggressive pursuit of corporate investigations 
presents several public policy concerns.275  Such an aggressive approach 
may have negative effects on corporations’ competitiveness and financial 
markets at large.276  Perhaps more significant is the perceived erosion of our 
adversarial system with respect to corporate investigations, which may vali-
date a slippery slope argument.277  The following discussion will address 
these main public policy concerns.278 
A. AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT RISKS A 
MYRIAD OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Prosecutorial witch-hunts put the stability of the financial markets at 
risk.279  In complex white-collar crime investigations, federal prosecutors 
have been vested with wide prosecutorial discretion.280  They decide not 
only the nature and the number of charges they choose to bring, but also if 
such charges should be brought against the business organization and/or 
culpable individuals.281 
It has been argued to the contrary that corporate prosecutions resulting 
from such prosecutorial powers have lead to stabilization in the financial 
markets and restoration of investors’ confidence as well as “accountability 
in corporate boardrooms.”282  However, prosecutors’ broad discretion to in-
dict a company may come at a high price, especially for innocent em-
ployees, as evidenced by the demise of Arthur Andersen.283  Moreover, it is 
 
275. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 272, at 632-33 (discussing the ethical problems 
encountered by business people in the wake of a federal investigation threat). 
276. See Gorman, supra note 130, at 904 (discussing the general impact of federal prosecu-
torial actions with regard to corporations). 
277. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Powers in an Adversarial System: Lessons 
from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 191 
(2004) (endorsing the view that federal prosecutions of white collar crimes move the adversarial 
system closer to the inquisitorial system). 
278. See generally id. at 208-10 (identifying the risks of prosecutorial discretion in white-
collar crime cases). 
279. Gorman, supra note 130, at 904. 
280. Lance Cole, Corporate Criminal Liability in the 21st Century: A New Era?, 45 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 147, 154 (2003). 
281. Id. 
282. See Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 110-11 (statement of Deputy Att’y 
Gen., DOJ, Paul J. McNulty) (explaining briefly the corporate scandals preceding the Thompson 
Memo and noting that the Thompson Memo promotes transparency in the charging process). 
283. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1229 (discussing the implications of the 
indictment of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen).  The authors note that not even the reversal 
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questionable whether the charging process is as transparent as professed 
and whether the federal prosecutorial guidelines are employed only for the 
purpose of the charging decision.284  These concerns are heightened when a 
former U.S. Attorney urges that “prosecutors should change or at least 
moderate how they are treating companies in criminal investigations.”285  
Some prosecutors, in their zealous endeavor to combat corporate miscon-
duct, skip a fundamental step in their discretionary corporate charging 
decision—whether the particular case is even appropriate for charging.286  
Such an automatic invocation of the DOJ’s prosecutorial guidelines in 
every corporate investigation could compromise and significantly endanger 
critical business organizations, as well as the interests of innocent share-
holders, employees, and customers.287  This is especially true considering 
how a company threatened with the possibility of an indictment is perceived 
in the financial markets.288 
Moreover, the core message of the DOJ’s prosecutorial principles, that 
companies be “good corporate citizens,” raises certain concerns.289  First, 
“[a]ll prosecutors recognize—or should—that no matter how good a 
company’s corporate culture and compliance programs are, there will al-
ways be crimes committed by employees.”290  Therefore, the logical ques-
tion becomes: how far does a company have to travel in its efforts to please 
the government so as to be considered a “good corporate citizen”?291  
 
of the Arthur Andersen’s conviction by a unanimous United States Supreme Court could have 
resurrected the firm and by the time it had been convicted the firm had ceased to exist.  Id.  See 
also White, supra note 137, at 817 (noting that little, if anything, would comfort the several 
thousands of Arthur Andersen’s honest employees who lost their jobs and professional 
reputations). 
284. See White, supra note 137, at 818-19 (expressing growing concern over how the 
Thompson Memo is being employed by some prosecutors in order to force companies into 
compliance and reform). 
285. Id. at 819 (explaining that a change in prosecutors’ attitudes toward companies in 
criminal investigations is necessary). 
286. Id. at 820. 
287. Id. at 825; see also Gorman, supra note 130, at 904 (stating that there is a tremendous 
amount of pressure on corporations facing federal investigations).  If the filing of criminal charges 
does not lead to a corporation’s demise, the corporation would at least be severely affected 
economically.  Id. at 904-05. 
288. See Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 50 (noting money-laundering allegations can affect 
publicly traded companies’ stock price); see also Arik Hessedahl, Dell Disappoints Once More 
(Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2006/ 
tc20060818_571306.htm (stating the news of federal investigations led to a drop in the stock 
price). 
289. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 311 (questioning the federal prosecutors’ authority to 
reform companies into good corporate citizens). 
290. White, supra note 137, at 819. 
291. See Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 49 (noting that Enron had a compliance plan that was 
regarded as state-of-the-art). 
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Establishing compliance programs and always being on alert for possible 
misconduct may require prohibitive additional costs that common sense 
dictates will inevitably spill over on consumers.292  Second, prosecutors’ 
aggressive approach toward corporate cooperation puts companies in a 
tough spot when deciding to cooperate or not.293  Choosing to cooperate 
may expose a company to substantial civil liability, while declining to 
cooperate increases the risk of a criminal indictment and the possibility of 
the company’s stock collapsing or of a corporate fatality similar to Arthur 
Andersen.294  Third, the lack of a bright-line definition of “cooperation” is 
problematic—the McNulty Memo, similar to the Thompson Memo, 
emphasizes cooperation between “responsible corporate leaders” and the 
DOJ.295  However, the DOJ has not yet provided a bright-line definition of 
cooperation that could end the current fear of indictment if an organization 
does not fully cooperate and protects individuals.296  For example, although 
the McNulty Memo generally prohibits prosecutors from counting 
advancement of legal fees against a corporation, prosecutors are still 
allowed to consider the corporation’s joint defense agreement in return for 
cooperation credits.297  Consequently, targeted business organizations would 
most probably be induced to also deny the advancement in light of an 
imminent criminal indictment, especially since the new prosecutorial prin-
ciples do not include a blanket prohibition for considering advancement of 
legal fees.298  Fourth, in today’s highly competitive corporate world, com-
panies must often provide incentives and safeguards to attract the most 
competent managers and employees.299  The Model Business Corporation 
Act300 considers the advancement of legal fees as employee contract 
 
292. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy 
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 107 (2004) (observing that over the last decade corporate 
expenditures on compliance have increased). 
293. Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and “Good Corporate 
Citizenship,” 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 981 (2002). 
294. See id. at 999 (providing ample examples of possible consequences for companies that 
choose to resist the threat of indictment). 
295. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at 3. 
296. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1145 (noting that an emphasis on full cooperation 
allows the government to “stack the deck against individual defendants”). 
297. Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Robert J. Malionek, Value of Cooperation: McNulty Memo 
Impact on DOJ, 236 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 2006, at 1. 
298. See supra Part II.C. (explaining the current prosecutorial instructions with respect to the 
advancement of legal fees). 
299. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005). 
300. A.B.A. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (3d ed., 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
buslaw/library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf. 
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incentives to be “sound public policy.”301  Once a company demonstrates a 
willingness to either terminate employees or refuse to advance attorney’s 
fees, that company may have difficulty recruiting and retaining new staff, 
which eventually could be as damaging as an indictment.302  This possibil-
ity would also “devastate corporate morale particularly if employees are 
terminated or prosecuted on privileged statements made to the corpora-
tion.”303  To maintain leadership in today’s global economy, American 
companies need to find the most talented personnel and provide them with a 
working environment that fosters trust and support in the company and in 
each other.304  The DOJ’s approach tempts companies with an incentive for 
contrary practices.305  These stated public policy reasons support the 
contention that the DOJ should adopt a potentially less destructive approach 
in its combat of corporate misconduct.306 
B. AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT UNDERMINES 
THE CORE OF OUR ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter explained: 
Our[] [system] is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial 
system. . . .  Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-American 
criminal justice since it freed itself from practices borrowed by the 
Star Chamber from the Continent. . . .  Under our system, society 
carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out 
of his own mouth.307 
Perhaps the most vital public policy concern with respect to the prose-
cutorial discretion under the DOJ’s approach is that it differs significantly 
from the adversarial ideal because the process is operating without any 
checks on prosecutorial powers.308  In our adversarial justice system, the 
 
301. Stephen A. Radin, Sinners Who Find Religion: Advancement of Litigation Expenses to 
Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REV. LITIG. 251, 262 (2006) (citing 2 MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.53 off. cmt. at 8-337 (3d ed. Supp. 2005)). 
302. See generally Gorman, supra note 130, at 905-06 (arguing that a corporation may be 
severely impeded from doing business as a consequence). 
303. Simons, supra note 293, at 998. 
304. See, e.g., Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d at 211 (considering indemnification as an 
inducement for attracting capable individuals into the business world). 
305. Gorman, supra note 130, at 913.  Because of the detrimental consequences criminal 
charges may bring, corporations would cooperate with the government rather than face the fate of 
Arthur Andersen.  Id. 
306. E.g., Hasnas, supra note 272, at 632-33. 
307. George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
985, 991 (2005) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949)). 
308. See Moohr, supra note 277, at 219 (concluding that the investigatory decisions of 
United States Attorneys are not generally supervised by the DOJ). 
      
804 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:767 
parties in a dispute are treated as equals and allowed to put forth their case 
in front of a trier of fact to decide the truthfulness of an accusation.309  This 
is significantly different from the inquisitorial system in which the investi-
gation is initiated and conducted by the state.310  A former federal prose-
cutor maintains that “[o]ur current system of justice, at least insofar as it 
applies to investigations of corporations and other organizations and their 
employees, has . . . reached . . . a point [beyond which even justice becomes 
unjust].”311  This observation appears accurate especially considering the 
summary effect of the government’s aggressive approach in rooting out 
corporate misconduct—companies are “expected to do the work, suffer any 
consequences and enable the Government to take credit for striking at 
white-collar crime.”312  The question becomes apparent: If the government 
can evade the adversarial system with respect to companies, what will stop 
it from eroding the adversarial system also with respect to citizens?313 
The DOJ’s trend of pressuring companies to either terminate or deny 
the advancement of legal fees to employees who are deemed “culpable” by 
the government, without any sort of adversarial procedure, illustrates this 
erosion at work.314  As a matter of public policy, and in accordance with the 
highly valued core characteristics of our criminal judicial system, the 
decision regarding culpability should be made in a court of law in the 
absence of voluntary self-incrimination.315  This concern also underlies the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) opposition to the policies provided in 
the Thompson Memo.316  Especially with regard to the advancing of legal 
fees, the ABA’s concern is evident.317  Interestingly, the ABA notes that the 
 
309. Id. at 192-23. 
310. Id.; see also Ellard, supra note 307, at 991-92 (“The Thompson Memorandum . . . [has] 
move[d] the investigative, charging, and plea process toward an inquisitorial system by shifting 
power from courts and juries to the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorneys who work for 
it.”). 
311. Janis, supra note 77, at preface. 
312. Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 47-48. 
313. See Moohr, supra note 277, at 219-20 (expressing concern over the DOJ’s inquisitorial 
approach). 
314. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-10 (discussing the policy 
of government and the practice of indemnification or advancement of attorney’s fees). 
315. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  The Stein court 
stated, referring to the government coercion on companies to deprive employees the means of 
defending themselves against criminal charges in a court of law, “the determination of guilt or 
innocence must be made fairly—not in a proceeding in which the government has obtained an 
unfair advantage long before the trial has even begun.”  Id. 
316. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-10 (noting the enormous 
impact of the language in the Thompson Memo). 
317. See generally id.  The ABA Task Force concludes that the Thompson Memo’s approach 
to the advancing of legal fees “strikes at the core of our adversarial system of justice.”  Id. at 10.  
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DOJ’s approach to the advancement issue runs counter to the DOJ’s own 
internal policies and regulations permitting the Department to pay for a 
prosecutor’s outside counsel in the event of a federal criminal 
investigation.318 
Judges and defense lawyers have now waived the cautionary flags with 
respect to prosecutorial practices.319  This skepticism signals that important 
foundational public policy concerns are at risk due to the aggressive 
strategies being employed by federal prosecutors.320  This interference 
undermines the core of our adversarial system of justice, and risks wider 
negative social and economic outcomes.321  Therefore, there is an urgent 
call for more prominent and concrete amendments to the government’s 
approach to corporate investigations.322  Former attorneys and white-collar 
crime defense lawyers have suggested several different modifications, yet 
the revision of the Thompson Memo has been slow and insubstantial.323 
V.  TAILORING A SOLUTION 
It is apparent that a balance must be struck between reducing corporate 
misconduct and protecting individuals’ rights and liberties.324  A balance 
must be struck also between governmental prosecutorial methods and 
companies’ defenses against indictment.325  The DOJ does not operate in a 
vacuum; rather, it continually measures the temperature of the legal com-
munity’s responses to its prosecutorial methods.326  In the wake of Stein 
 
The Task Force also falls short of finding any legitimate government interest in pressuring 
companies to deny their employees advancement of legal fees.  Id. 
318. Id. at 10 n.32. 
319. E.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
320. See Gorman, supra note 130, at 904-05 (pointing out the pressures and harsh 
consequences organizations face because of vague standards). 
321. Id. 
322. E.g., Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 125 (testimony of Former Att’y Gen., 
Edwin Meese, III) (recognizing the importance of ensuring that “members and suspected members 
of whatever criminal class . . . still receive the full benefit of the constitutional rights and fairness 
considerations that belong to every American”). 
323. See, e.g., id. at 130 (providing several recommendations); see also Janis, supra note 77 
(finding “striking” that the “Thompson Memorandum has been adopted virtually verbatim in the 
McNulty Memorandum,” and stating the McNulty Memo, in fact, institutionalizes the “‘culture of 
waivers,’” which the Thompson Memo has been criticized for having created).  
324. See supra Part III (discussing the constitutional rights implications). 
325. See generally John Hasnas, Department of Coercion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2006, at A9 
(“Under current federal law and [DOJ] policy, it would be irresponsible management to attempt to 
defend the corporation or its employees.”). 
326. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to 
Heads of Dep’t Components U.S. Att’ys on Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work 
Product Protection (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org.poladv/ 
mccaluummemo212005.pdf (responding to the increasing criticism over the DOJ’s approach to 
waivers of these privileges). 
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and new unanimous criticism of the prosecutorial guidelines, perhaps the 
DOJ will soon reconsider its strategy and amend its approach with respect 
to the advancement of a legal fees provision.327 
Complete elimination of the factors enumerated in the various federal 
prosecutorial guidelines would not necessarily be desirable because of the 
risk of lessened predictability and transparency.328  For example, instead of 
the current totality approach, the DOJ could specify which, if any, of the 
factors can or may be ignored and under what circumstances.329  Former 
Attorney General Edwin Meese validly points out that “[i]t is axiomatic that 
when a governmental body or agency defines rules for its own conduct that 
are vague and indefinite, it thereby retains to itself near-absolute discretion 
to act as it may choose in any given circumstance.”330  Although the gov-
ernment contended in Stein that KPMG’s decision not to advance legal fees 
to employees under investigation was a business decision made without 
government interference, the Government’s position is naïve.331  Few, if 
any, risk-aversive corporate counsel and companies would believe they 
really have a choice of action.332 
The Federal District Court noted in Stein that corporate cooperation 
with the government, by honoring agreements of advancement of legal fees, 
is not necessarily unfeasible.333  Thus, the provision that deals with the 
advancement issue could be modified so that any reference to it is 
eliminated.334  This seems to be a necessary step especially because of the 
effect it can have on corporate officers’ and employees’ constitutional rights 
in this type of complex criminal case.335  Alternatively, the policies could 
 
327. See Karen J. Mathis, ABA President, Statement Regarding Revisions to the Justice 
Department’s Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
abanet/media/statement.cfm?releaseid=59 (stating that the revisions under the McNulty Memo 
“fall short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of . . . employee protections during 
government investigations”). 
328. Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 113 (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, 
Paul McNulty).  
329. Id. at 127 (testimony of Former Att’y Gen. Edwin Meese, III). 
330. Id.  
331. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the 
United States Attorney’s Office knowingly reinforced the inherent threat of criminal charges 
found in the Thompson Memo). 
332. See Hasnas, supra note 272, at 633 (alluding to a corporation’s final decision to 
cooperate with the government). 
333. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d, at 363. 
334. Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 130-31 (testimony of Former Att’y Gen., 
Edwin Meese, III). 
335. Id. 
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be amended so that employees no longer have to fear for their jobs if they 
assert their right against self-incrimination.336 
A more proactive suggestion would be a revision of the nature of 
criminal corporate liability to reflect a company’s efforts to deter criminal 
conduct by its employees.337  Thus, some practitioners argue that the gov-
ernment should bear the burden of showing that a company’s compliance 
program is not sufficient to prevent misconduct.338  However, such an 
approach may not be sufficient after all.339 
There may be a way for business organizations to stand by their 
employees without being discounted as non-cooperative.340  For example, 
the federal prosecutorial guidelines, now outlined in the McNulty Memo, 
could provide some guidance as to how the Government determines who is 
a “culpable” employee or agent.341  Also, because there could be situations 
where the government’s assessment of an employee’s culpability does not 
correspond to a company’s internal investigation, the guidelines should 
explain whose assessment should prevail and why.342 
Until the DOJ adopts a clearer standard, corporate counsel and com-
panies ought to look over their charters, bylaws, or any individual agree-
ments regarding the advancement question.343  Moreover, defense experts 
recommend that any discussions with the government should be well 
documented.344  Furthermore, corporate counsel should be permitted to 
explain to employees who are subject to internal investigation interviews 
the nature and purpose of the interview, and clarify that the attorney 
represents the company and not the individual.345  Separate counsel should 
be made available to employees, since only after being advised by counsel 
serving their interests, they might make an informed decision as to whether 
 
336. Id. at 147-48 (written testimony by Andrew Weissman, Partner Jenner & Block LLP). 
337. Id. 
338. See, e.g., id. at 149 (arguing that the government should establish that the corporation 
did not employ effective policies). 
339. See, e.g., Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 50 (noting that Enron had adopted a state-of-the-art 
compliance program, yet misconduct was obviously not prevented). 
340. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that 
prior to criminal indictment there must be a way for justice to be done without threatening an 
indictment and coercing companies to turn against their officers and employees). 
341. See generally id. (implying that prosecutors’ determination based on their own criteria 
should be inadmissible). 
342. See, e.g., Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (arguing that the government’s subjective 
determination of who is “culpable” also undermines the adversary system). 
343. Couden, supra note 5, at 423. 
344. Id. 
345. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 26. 
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to talk to the counsel for the company or to assert their Fifth Amendment 
rights.346 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current state of law concerning an individual’s right against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel in the federal corporate investigations 
context is certainly ambiguous.347 Although most of the criticism of the 
DOJ’s corporate investigations approach has focused on the waiver of the 
attorney-client and work product privileges, fresh controversy is emerging 
over advancement of legal fees.348  Hopefully, these new concerns will spur 
the DOJ into adopting some of the suggestions discussed above.  The best 
outcome would be that the DOJ completely disregard corporations’ 
advancement of legal fees.349 
The Stein case may only be the tip of the iceberg in judicial review of 
the controversial prosecutorial policies that emerged in the wake of Enron 
and other corporate citizens.350  Obviously, the goal of rooting out corporate 
misconduct is noble and beneficial to the entire society.  However, when 
the spillover effects amount to violations of an individual’s fundamental 
rights, the consequences should no longer be accepted as collateral dam-
age.351  Only time and the frequency of future Enron-like debacles will tell 
whether constitutional considerations trump entrepreneurial prosecutorial 
means. 
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346. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1231. 
347. E.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Mark 
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